Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government by Farina, Cynthia R. & Metzger, Gillian E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2015 
Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government 
Cynthia R. Farina 
Gillian E. Metzger 
Columbia Law School, gmetzg1@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian E. Metzger, Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1683 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/42 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
ESSAYS
INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF AGENCIES IN
POLARIZED GOVERNMENT
Cynthia R. Farina & Gillian E. Metzger*
Peter Strauss's The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers.
and the Fourth Branch' reshaped contemporary thinking about the
constitutionality of federal administrative government. When the article
appeared in 1984, the Reagan Revolution was in full swing. Reagan's
overtly antiregulatory policy stance and his Administration's advocacy of
a highly formalist and originalist style of constitutional interpretation
fundamentally challenged the post-New Deal administrative state.
Aggressive interpretation of Article II led to controversial strategies of
White House control: centralized rulemaking review, appointment of
agency heads loyal to the President's (anti)regulatory agenda, and
attacks on institutions of administrative independence such as the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions and career civil servants.2
The Place of Agencies was a masterful defense of the constitutional
legitimacy of American administrative government. Professor Strauss
insisted on the essential constitutional distinction between the apex-
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court-and the vast apparatus
of administration beneath. In this view, the Constitution prescribes strict
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers only at the apex.3
Below this level, two other structural principles dominate: a separation-
of-functions requirement rooted in due process and a checks-and-
balances concern with avoiding excessive accumulation of power in any
single governmental entity.4 Administrative agencies are constitutional so
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1. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies].
2. See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming
Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1130-
31 (2008) (noting significant increase in politicization of appointments and agency
personnel under Reagan Administration); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277-80 (2001) (describing development of centralized regulatory
review under Reagan Administration); Kevin M. Stack, Obama's Equivocal Defense of
Agency Independence, 26 Const. Comment. 583, 585-94 (2010) (describing Reagan
Administration's attack on independent agencies).




long as they have relationships of control and accountability with each of
the actors at the apex: "The three must share the reins of control; means
must be found of assuring that no one of them becomes dominant."5 In
emphasizing the constitutional need for significant relationships between
agencies and all of the "opposed, politically powerful actors at the apex
of government," 6 Professor Strauss pushed back on assertions of unitary
presidential control. Rather, as he developed further in later work, the
President is to be an "overseer," not a "decider"-a supervisory role
shared in important ways with Congress.
7
Our own thinking about separation of powers is so deeply indebted
to Professor Strauss's work that we relished the opportunity to consider
The Place of Agencies thirty years later. Some things have not changed
much: centralized regulatory review, politicized agency appointments,
and agency independence remain fiercely debated.' More fundamentally,
however, the world seems a very different place. Funding the government
has become an ongoing exercise in political "chicken" that debilitates
agency planning9 and unsettles domestic and international financial
markets."l Delays have so plagued the agency appointments process that
a Democrat-controlled Senate finally exercised the long-threatened
"nuclear option" of limiting the filibuster. 1 Overall, the productivity of
the 112th and 113th Congresses fell to levels historically associated with
national crises. 2 No one would have described the Reagan or Clinton
5. Id. at 579-80.
6. Id. at 581.
7. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704-05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss,
Overseer or Decider].
8. The literature on these issues is vast, and Professor Strauss, has not surprisingly,
been a leading participant in the ongoing debate. See, e.g id., at 700-05 (describing and
rejecting claims of unitary executive power by the Bush II Administration); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 968-75 (1997) (describing increased
presidential role in and politicization of rulemaking). For a sampling of the broader debates
in other scholarship on point, see Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative
Law: Cases and Comments 213-42, 685-761 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing centralized
regulatory review, presidential direction of agency decisionmaking, agency independence
and presidential removal power, and appointments).
9. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev
1739, 1751 (2015).
10. See, e.g., Katy Burne, Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, Markets Are Anxious Over
Fears of Default, Wall St.J. (Oct. 12, 2013, 12:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304500404579129801171185802 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
11. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger "Nuclear" Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-
poised-to-limit-fiibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9feO-fd2ca728e67c-story.html [http://perma.cc/3N4V-GEWL].
12. Daniel Newhauser, No, the 113th Congress Wasn't the Least Productive Ever,
Nat'lJ. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/no-the-113th-congress
-wasn-t-the-least-productive-ever-20141223 [http://perma.cc/98J7-WZS7] (citing analyses
of political scientists Sarah Binder and David Mayhew).
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years as eras of good feeling between the House, Senate, and White
House. Still, major social and economic legislation was enacted and
government (despite some conspicuous stutters like the 1995 to 1996
shutdowns), for the most part, moved forward. 13 The George W. Bush
years saw increasingly incandescent partisan rhetoric and unparalleled
presidential adventurism, but the perceived exigencies of September 11
and four years of rare unified party control allowed government, for the
most part, to continue. 4 By late in the Bush II Administration, however,
scholars had begun to speak of "broken" institutions, 5 and the Obama
years have seen growing pessimism about the capacity of a 200-year-old
constitutional structure to produce reliable, effective governance.
16
How does this altered political reality affect the complex inter-
institutional roles and dependencies traced out in The Place ofAgencies? Are
gridlock and partisan "tribal warfare" 7 the new normal at the apex of
national government? If so, the intricate system of separated, checked-and-
balanced powers that Professor Strauss so adroitly described may be
vanishing-an anachronism to which lip service must be given, so long as
the Constitution is formally unamended, but which must be mitigated and
circumvented by those seeking reliable, effective governance. If, instead,
hope remains for abating polarization and hyperpartisanship, can the
institutions of administrative government below the apex facilitate this
shift by, for example, providing opportunities for bipartisan engagement
and the emergence of new areas of common ground?
These are very large questions that obviously cannot be resolved in
this setting. The pair of essays that follow do, however, make a start.
In Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?,
Cynthia Farina looks at the phenomenon of polarization, focusing on the
rancorous and embattled legislative branch the Constitution places at the
forefront of our system of government. Divided into two chambers with
very different representational bases, and saddled by the Constitution
and longstanding practice with various supermajoritarian hurdles to
action, Congress has always suffered significant structural challenges as a
13. See David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don't Kill the U.S.
Constitutional System 45 tbl.2.1, 69 tbl.2.3, 73 tbl.2.4 (2011) (presenting success of Reagan
and Clinton, with other modem Presidents, in getting legislative agendas through Congress).
14. See id. (highlighting passage of USA Patriot Act and other 9/11-driven legislation
as well as Bush II Administration's overall success from 2005 to 2006 and in early 2001).
15. E.g., Thomas E. Mann & NormanJ. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress
Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 17 (2008).
16. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional
Dysfunction?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1689-91 (2015).





political actor-especially as compared with the President. 8 Perhaps for
this reason, dire warnings about congressional dysfunction have a
venerable history in American political commentary.1 9 In recent years,
however, institutional disability seems to have degenerated into institu-
tional incapacity. Now, Congress often manages to be only a spoiler of
others' initiatives, unable to engage productively in the shared enterprise
of governing contemplated by the Constitution.
Hyperpartisan legislative deadlock has already significantly affected
the behavior of the other actors at the apex, as well as the operation of
administrative government beneath. 2 If this condition is unlikely to
improve, the constitutional and policy implications are profound.
Balance cannot be maintained, nor can the reins of control over
administration be shared, if one of the principal actors has retreated into
self-absorbed obstructionism. Professor Farina's contribution reviews the
rich political science literature on polarization to discover what is known
about its nature, degree, and causes. She finds some core areas of
agreement, much unresolved conflict about important dimensions, and
little definitive evidence about causation. (This last is perhaps fortunate,
for most of the proposed remedies would require changes in the
Constitution, embedded electoral processes, or both.) Most important
for present purposes, she discerns several areas in which the potential
exists for shifts in a depolarizing direction. Things are not certain to get
better-but they are also not nearly so certain as the sound-bites suggest
to stay this bad.
Against this backdrop of guarded optimism, in Agencies, Polarization,
and the States, Gillian Metzger examines how high levels of polarization
have changed regulatory government and how, in turn, agencies might
contribute to changing polarized politics. Partisan warfare conducted
within divided government necessarily affects the relationships of control
and accountability that are the subject of The Place of Agencies. Most
centrally, as legislative deadlock undermines Congress's ability to direct
agency action, the President is incentivized and empowered to use
agencies as tools for unilateral policymaking. Still, these recognized effects
of polarization tell only part of the story. With broad powers exercisable
without the kinds of inter-institutional agreement that hyperpartisanism
can stymie, agencies continue to govern even in highly polarized times.
This ongoing ability to make and adapt major federal policy enables
agencies to shape, as well as be shaped by, the political environment. A
critical element of this dynamic is the role played by state governments in
18. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (contrasting "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and despatch" of energetic single
executive with deliberateness of numerous legislature).
19. E. Scott Adler &John D. Wilkerson, Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
3-4 (2013).
20. See Metzger, supra note 9, passim.
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federal programs, which can reinforce national political divides but also
motivate new crosscutting alliances.
Professor Metzger examines these complex effects using the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a case study on administration and polar-
ization in practice. The ACA stands as the poster child for hyperparti-
sanship. Repealing Obamacare remains the Republican Party's unifying
mantra, while the Obama Administration has embraced significant uni-
lateral actions in its zeal to make the Act work. The picture of imple-
mentation, however, is far more complex, with red states increasingly
reaching deals with the Administration to expand Medicaid and the
Department of Health and Human Services taking a flexible approach to
bring as many states as possible on board. The story of the ACA thus
reinforces the need for more nuanced accounts of the place of agencies in
a polarized world.
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